In the following centuries, many Italians celebrated Fieschi as a tragic hero, who fell while trying to strike a blow against tyranny and foreign oppression. 3 In the eighteenth century, Friedrich Schiller even wrote an opera about him, titled "The Republican Tragedy" (1783). Modern historians are harsher: one refers to the conspiracy as "pathetic," while another dismisses Fieschi as an "idiot" who was being manipulated by both the Pope and the King of France. 4 What I am interested in, however, is how Charles V, the king of Spain at the time, and his resident ambassador in Genoa, Gómez Suárez de Figueroa, interpreted this event. The casual observer might laugh at Fieschi, and dismiss this whole episode as a mere sideshow of history. But the evidence suggests that the Spanish ambassador and his monarch did not laugh. They believed they had narrowly escaped the loss of a crucial ally, and it scared them badly.
What is even more interesting, however, is that the Spaniards could have easily prevented the whole thing. 5 As we shall see, the Spanish intelligence network picked up early warnings of the conspiracy a full eighteen months before it happened. In fact, Charles V ordered Figueroa to be on his guard, but the ambassador blithely assured him that there was nothing to worry about. The Fieschi affair thus represents a classic case of intelligence failure: not because the Spaniards failed to discover information, but rather because they had the information and failed to act on it.
One final point of interest about the Fieschi affair is what happened to Figueroa in punishment for committing such a monumental blunder: apparently, nothing. He would continue at his post for another twenty-two years, until his death in 1569. In fact, a mere two months after the attempted coup, Charles accepted Figueroa's advice on the extremely delicate political question of whether to seize power in Genoa. At a time when Charles was considering assuming direct imperial control of numerous northern Italian territories, it is remarkable that the same man whose egregious error in judgment had almost cost the Spaniards a crucial Italian ally should so dissuade the emperor.
To understand why Charles and his ambassador in Genoa were so frightened by the Fieschi conspiracy, we have to remember the geopolitical context. The Republic of Genoa was critically important for Charles V's strategic goals. 6 In the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, Genoa had wavered between allying with France or Spain, but in 1528 Andrea Doria, admiral of the Genoese fleet, made a decisive move into the Habsburg camp. From that point on 5 Paolo Lingua suggests that Fieschi's intentions were fairly obvious, but Figueroa and Doria dismissed him as an innocuous dreamer. Andrea Doria, 161-162. I agree, but I also have found more hard evidence of it. Genoa was a crucial partner in Charles's attempts to establish hegemony in Italy and the Mediterranean. On land, having Genoa as an ally helped cement Habsburg control of northern Italy, and kept communication lines open between Spain and its Italian territories (Naples and Milan). At sea, the Genoese fleet fought in all of Charles's Mediterranean campaigns, especially against the Turks.
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Perhaps even more important, Genoese bankers financed Charles's empire, providing critically important loans to the Emperor. 8 So for political, strategic, and economic reasons, Charles depended on the alliance with Genoa; in Charles's famous political testament of 1548, he told his son Philip that of all the states in Italy, "Genoa is the most important of all to us. Act shrewdly and skillfully in your dealings with it."
9 Thus any threat to Andrea Doria's friendly regime was taken very seriously indeed.
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In order to maintain good diplomatic relations with Genoa, and to keep an eye out for trouble, Charles depended on his resident ambassadors in that city. And for much of Charles's reign, that meant depending on a particular ambassador, Gómez Suárez de Figueroa, who filled that post for an extraordinary forty years (1529-1569). Very little has been written about Figueroa; in fact historians sometimes confuse him with a contemporary Spanish noble with the same name. 11 We know that the ambassador Gómez Suárez de Figueroa came from a hidalgo family in Guadalajara, Spain. He served in the king's personal bodyguard before being appointed a captain of infantry in Italy. He was one of the knights who escorted King Francis I of France back to Spain after his capture at the battle of Pavia in 1525.
12 So as a young man he had a distinguished military career, and had personal connections with Charles. We also know that he was sent to Genoa as a replacement for the previous ambassador, Lope de had fallen into serious disfavor with Andrea Doria. 13 The fact that Figueroa remained at his post for the next forty years would seem to be a testament to his diplomatic abilities-but the Fieschi conspiracy definitely represents one of the low points of his career.
The Fieschi were one of the oldest and most prestigious noble families in Genoa; in 1243 a member of that family was elected pope (Innocent IV), the first Genoese to receive that honor.
14 In the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries they had close ties to the French monarchy, as did many of the older noble houses. It is these very families who would become increasingly marginalized when Andrea Doria decisively switched allegiance to the Habsburgs in 1528. 15 Concerning the report sent by His Majesty's ambassador in France, that a gentleman of the House of Fieschi has arrived there, offering to the King that he would start a popular revolt and throw Prince Doria out of the city, His Majesty ordered that I be informed, concerning which I have done due diligence to learn who this person could be… Having communicated with the Prince and examined well this business, we have determined that this person is a bastard son of the Count of Fieschi who was in Marseilles to study… and that he learned that the French are featherbrains who will believe anything [sean ligeros a creer qualquier cosa]… If the Count was involved in this matter there would be something to worry about, but I cannot believe that he proceeds in this way because it is doubtful that he would risk losing everything he has. So to both the Prince [Doria] and myself it seems there is nothing to this story, especially considering the state of things, with no army in the field and no fleet at sea. If I learn anything else I will let Your Highness know.
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This was a crucial moment, when Figueroa received what turned out to be accurate information, but dismissed it. 23 We should note, of course, that Andrea Doria seems equally culpable. They both refused to believe that Fieschi could be foolhardy enough to risk his fortune and his life. They underestimated his idealism, or perhaps overestimated his intelligence. Figueroa's sneering contempt for the French is also telling. Rumors out of France, he suggested, should be discounted, simply because of the credulity of the French. Figueroa's casual bigotry nearly cost him dearly. His attitude is also striking given that when the Fieschi conspiracy actually occurred, Figueroa immediately assumed (incorrectly) that the French were directly involved.
Over the next year and a half Figueroa referred to Fieschi several times in his official correspondence, so evidently he was watching him. There were "The Political World of Charles V," in Charles V 1500-1558 and his Time, ed. Hugo Soly (Antwerp: Mercatorfonds, 1999), 113-225. 22 Figueroa to Philip, 30 June 1545; AGSE 1377, #19-20. Arturo Pacini also discusses this document (La Genova di Andrea Doria, 602-603), but does not stress its importance from the point of view of intelligence failure. 23 An important historian of Spanish diplomacy, Miguel Ángel Ochoa Brun, claims that Figueroa should be given credit for detecting and defeating the Fieschi conspiracy, but he does not seem to be aware of the documents above. Historia de la diplomacia española, Vol. V, "La diplomacia de Carlos V" (Madrid: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 1999), 491-492. additional warning signs. For example, Figueroa wrote several letters concerning Fieschi's efforts to purchase warships (the very ones he would use during the attempted coup). These efforts involved complex negotiations with Pope Paul III, and the pope's bastard son, Pier Luigi Farnese, the duke of Castro, Parma and Piacenza. Charles and his ministers were highly suspicious of both the pope and his son, who clearly had ambitions for expanding their power in northern Italy, at Spanish-imperial expense. Indeed, as we shall see, one of the direct consequences of the Fieschi conspiracy would be the assassination of Pier Luigi in September 1547, with at least tacit approval from the emperor. 24 Figueroa mentioned this matter of Fieschi's acquisition of ships as early as January 1546. In a few brief lines, the ambassador reported that Fieschi was negotiating the purchase of ships from Pope Paul, although the pope was unwilling; apparently he had originally promised the ships to his son Pier Luigi. 25 Figueroa did not seem to be alarmed. This was a routine report on the movement of men and munitions in Italy, the sort of thing he commented on constantly. Three months later, however, Figueroa's reports take a strange turn. On April 9, 1546 the ambassador wrote that Fieschi had left Genoa in order to meet with Pier Luigi Farnese. Furthermore, he reported that Fieschi was upset with Charles [muestra algun descontento], because he had written a letter to the Emperor concerning the purchase of ships, and Charles had not responded. As Figueroa wrote, "Your Majesty knows that in this city [Fieschi's] house has much authority and influence, and the Count is young and jealous of his honor, and so I believe it would be a very great favor if Your Majesty ordered a response to be sent to him, as a vassal and servant."
26 So here we have the ambassador warning the emperor that he had offended Fieschi, his good and loyal subject! 28 In January 1547 he would be in for a rude shock.
At the time of the Fieschi conspiracy, Andrea Doria was 80 years old and often ill. Much depended on this one man. Back in 1528, Doria had signed a personal contract of allegiance to Charles, giving the Admiral wide independent powers in return for Genoa's nominal loyalty to the Emperor.
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Charles's relations with Genoa were thus based on a personal relationship with the city's leader, which was typical of the structure of Charles's empire. 30 Figueroa and the other Spanish ministers in Italy constantly expressed concerns about Doria's health, and what would happen when he died. (They could not know he wouldn't die until 1560, at the age of 93.) For example, Ferrante Gonzaga, the GovernorGeneral of Milan and Charles's military commander in northern Italy, wrote to Charles just the day before the Fieschi affair that it was not wise to depend too much on a man who seemed to be on the point of death.
31
Gonzaga warned that Charles needed to have a plan in place, and military force at hand, for the day when Doria died, because of the "diversity of humors and passions" amongst the Genoese citizens, which could lead to "notable disorder and disservice for Your Majesty." In other words, Gonzaga did not feel certain that Genoa would remain loyal to Charles in the event of Doria's death. Gonzaga was obviously less confident than Figueroa about Genoese loyalty. Gonzaga also had a personal agenda; as the historian M. J. Rodríguez-Salgado has recently pointed out, Gonzaga plotted to increase his territorial power base in Milan, and Genoa was 28 Other Spanish ambassadors in Italy displayed the same arrogance; see Michael J. Levin one of the nearby states he contemplated annexing.
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In any case, in the wake of the Fieschi affair, both Gonzaga and Figueroa repeatedly urged Charles to take action.
Let us return to the events of January 3, 1547, as seen through the eyes of the Spanish ambassador. His first report, written at 2:00 that morning, was rather short and breathless. He knew little for sure. Fieschi and an unknown number of soldiers had apparently taken control of key points in the city. Crowds of people in the streets shouted "Liberty and the People!" while rumors flew that both Andrea Doria and his heir were already dead. Figueroa himself took refuge in the Ducal palace, which for the moment was still under the control of the government and strongly defended. Figueroa noted that he had requested aid from Gonzaga, and would send Charles constant updates. "Matters will be remedied as best they can for Your Majesty's service," he wrote, none too reassuringly. 33 Clearly he had been taken by surprise, and was greatly alarmed, not to say panicked.
Twenty hours later, Figueroa wrote a much calmer letter, indicating that the crisis was already over. 34 "Matters have been resolved on good terms," he declared. "From what I can tell, and not without much work and danger, affairs have been pacified, at the pleasure of Our Lord." Fieschi was dead, drowned in the harbor, and the government was back in control. To Figueroa's knowledge the aborted revolt had not done any real damage, with the major exception of the murder of Giannettino Doria. Andrea Doria was not dead, although he had bolted from the city, and was holed up in a secure location fifteen miles away. (Presumably Figueroa was worried about the loss of face for Doria.) Figueroa also noted that much of the Genoese fleet had been disarmed, and the rowing slaves disbanded, a serious inconvenience for the imperial military service. While the tone of this letter is calmer than in the previous one, Figueroa still warned that Gonzaga should send Spanish infantry to the city, to reinforce the Emperor's "reputation" as well as to secure the situation.
Ferrante Gonzaga, at around the same time, wrote a similar set of letters that if anything were even more alarmed and alarming. Upon hearing the initial news of the revolt, Gonzaga had immediately put all of the imperial forces in Italy on high alert. 35 He ordered the Spanish fleet in Sicily to prepare to sail to Genoa, and sent a request for additional soldiers to Cosimo de'Medici, Duke of 32 M. J. Rodríguez-Salgado, "Ferrante Gonzaga: the Champion of Innocence," in Ferrante Gonzaga: Il Mediterraneo, l'Impero (1507-1557), ed. Gianvittorio Signorotto (Rome: Bulzoni Editore, 2009), . 33 Figueroa to Charles, 3 January 1547; Àtti, 13-14. 34 Figueroa to Charles, 3 January 1547; ibid., 14-15. 35 Gonzaga to Charles, 3 January 1547; ibid., 16-17.
Florence. 36 Furthermore, Gonzaga promised he would mobilize as many as 4,000 troops, because, he said, "This rebellion could not have happened without the knowledge and intelligence of the King of France, and undoubtedly the French have abetted this tumult in every possible way, knowing as they do how much harm to Your Majesty could result." It is telling that Gonzaga immediately assumed that the Fieschi conspiracy had a French connection. The Emperor Charles and King Francis I of France had been fighting over Italy for decades, so this was a natural assumption to make. Interestingly, other European powers also came to the same conclusion. On January 15, William Paget, a member of Henry VIII's privy council and his secretary of state, received an intelligence report that "the commons of Genoa have risen against the nobility, disarmed the Emperor's galleys and released the slaves. If this be true, the French King is here thought the doer." 37 In fact, however, everyone was wrong: King Francis had no direct involvement. He most likely encouraged Fieschi, but gave no material support. By January 1547 Francis was nearly bankrupt, and almost exclusively focused on recovering French territory he had lost in his wars against England. 38 The fact that no one realized this is perhaps another sign of the limits of political intelligence in this period. Throughout this crisis Gonzaga and Figueroa repeatedly warned Charles that France was behind Fieschi, although they had no hard evidence. The possibility of losing Genoa back to France seemed all too real.
On the day after the Fieschi affair, Figueroa wrote to Gonzaga that things seemed to be under control, and that Gonzaga no longer needed to send troops.
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"With God's help," he wrote, "the city is persevering and returning to its usual pristine state, and when the Prince [Andrea Doria] returns everything will be peaceful." But Figueroa himself was not placid; he was furious, and frightened. He wanted vengeance, and to make an example of the conspirators. As he wrote to Gonzaga, "It is fitting that His Majesty should punish such great disobedience… and to restrain the insolence of those with evil inclinations, for if it is not done there could be another major disturbance, and it will not be in my power to impede or remedy it." Figueroa was clearly rattled by the bad night he had had the day before, and felt unprepared to handle another similar crisis. Over the next few weeks, he would demand help. One may consider that matters are not as secure as they should be, and there needs to be a remedy in order to avoid another major disturbance when the Prince [Andrea Doria] dies… there ought to be some guard residing here… for I would have no confidence in being able to remedy or resist the fury of a people like this, who are so fond of novelties [novedades] , and who have such passions, the more so now that this new enmity has been introduced, which could lead to another major fire being lit.
This reference to novedades is particularly interesting to me. In my previous work, I have described how often the Spanish ambassadors in Rome and Venice used this word in their correspondence. we see the Spanish ambassador in Genoa saying the same thing. 42 In any case, at this moment Figueroa obviously did not feel in control of the situation.
Figueroa was also not very patient about getting a response. On January 8, he wrote again to Charles. 43 He did have some good news to report: Andrea Doria had returned to the city, along with one of his top lieutenants, Agostino Spinola. The Spinola family was closely aligned with the imperial cause, and Figueroa clearly felt better with Spinola back in the city. In fact Figueroa had a specific suggestion for Charles: there should be a Spanish garrison permanently based in Genoa, and Agostino Spinola should be named captain general. That way, if anything happened in the future, the Emperor would have force at hand, under the control of a trustworthy commander. Figueroa again emphasized that Andrea Doria was old and could die any day, and that things could fall apart very quickly; as Figueroa pointed out, during the Fieschi revolt it had only taken an hour for the Doria regime to lose control of both the city and the fleet. The next day, Ferrante Gonzaga wrote a letter to Charles proposing the very same plan: he had obviously agreed with Figueroa to present a united front. 44 In addition, Gonzaga suggested that Charles should construct a new castle in or near Genoa, as additional protection and safeguard against losing the city. 45 It seems that Gonzaga had been just as spooked by the Fieschi affair as Figueroa.
Let us now return to Charles. For much of the previous year, the emperor had been fully occupied by the war against the Schmalkaldic League of German Protestants. He had boldly decided to fight through the winter months of 1546, and enjoyed remarkable success, but at great personal cost. By early January he was ill and exhausted, and hoped to turn over command of the German war to his brother Ferdinand.
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Then Figueroa's dispatches arrived. Charles received Figueroa's first report concerning the Fieschi conspiracy on January 10, and wrote back immediately. 47 He kept his cool, at least on paper: he noted the news "has displeased us, as is right," and wished to know more about what was happening. He approved Gonzaga's request to raise money for troops, and to ask Cosimo de'Medici for more. He also agreed with Gonzaga's assumption that the French 42 Nor was this the first time Figueroa used the word. On 25 June 1531, when Figueroa had only been at his post for two years, he wrote to Charles: "I have no doubt, as I have written to Your Majesty before, that there are people here who bear us ill will, not because they have cause, but rather because they are fond of novedades and for their own particular ends." Archivo General de Simancas, Estado, leg. 1363, #32. 43 Figueroa to Charles, 8 January 1547; Àtti, 33-36. 44 Gonzaga to Charles, 9 January 1547; ibid.,40-44. 45 Andrea Doria would resist this plan for a Spanish fortress in his city, and it never happened. Lingua, op. cit.,177-178. 46 Brandi, op. cit., 562-563. 47 Charles to Figueroa, 10 January 1547; Àtti, 47-48. must be involved all of this. He had no specific instructions for his ambassador, other than to investigate, and get the full story behind "this novedad."
Four days later Charles wrote again, to inform his ambassador that he was sending a special envoy to Genoa, Don Rodrigo de Mendoza, a gentleman of the royal household, to consult with the Genoese government about what steps needed to be taken to avoid further novedades. 48 Charles wrote, "Considering everything that touches on this novedad that occurred in that city, and that every day something similar could happen, it is more than necessary that whatever provision, order, or law that is needed for the affairs of the city should be effected… so that no similar disturbances may occur, and that no one may provoke novedades or seditions…." So Charles, too, expressed fear of novedades, and wanted his ambassadors to push the Genoese government to take whatever steps were necessary to prevent more of them.
But the really interesting thing is that Charles did not trust the Genoese government to do all that was necessary. In a secret, coded letter to Figueroa, Charles suggested that perhaps more drastic action was called for, especially given "the desire of the French to take power in that [city], and the diverse inclinations which always exist in that people [of Genoa], who are so fond of changes, alterations, and novedades."
49
As a remedy, what if Charles assumed control of Genoa? (The term he used was impatronirse, to bring the city under direct imperial rule.) As he says in this letter, if he took this action, he would then "be the master of the armed forces, and I would always hold the city securely, free of the aforementioned inconveniences." Charles was not proposing unilateral action; in fact, he suggested that Figueroa should sound out Andrea Doria, the Spinolas, and other Genoese loyal to Charles, to see if they would approve of this idea. Charles also stated that he had no intention of removing Genoa's current republican form of government. Nonetheless it is important to note that Charles was worried enough about losing Genoa that he seriously considered taking it over. Better that, he wrote, than to have the French win back the city, "which would mean the loss of so much effort and money… and the inconveniences which you could well imagine for the peace of Italy, and for our other kingdoms and states." In fact, during the period 1546-1547 Charles and his ministers considered the merits of incorporating a number of northern Italian territories under direct imperial rule, including Lucca, Parma, and Siena, in addition to Genoa. 50 For Charles, the crisis in Genoa represented part of a much larger strategic debate. 48 Charles to Figueroa, 14 January 1547; ibid.,49-50. 49 Charles to Figueroa, 14 January 1547; ibid., 55-57. 50 José Martínez Millán and Manuel Rivero Rodríguez, "Hacia la formación de la Monarquía Hispana: la hegemonía hispana en Italia (1547-1556)," in La corte de Carlos V, ed. José Martínez Meanwhile, Figueroa and Gonzaga, with Andrea Doria's keen assistance, were aggressively pursuing and prosecuting Fieschi's family and friends. All of the Fieschi lands and castles were seized, in a series of campaigns. 51 But the Spanish ministers did not relax their vigil. For one thing, they still feared a French invasion (although it never did materialize). And to make matters worse, it became increasingly clear that there had been yet another hand pulling Fieschi's strings: Pope Paul III. At this historical moment, tensions between the pope and the emperor were already high, primarily due to profound disagreements about the Council of Trent. Even at this late date, Charles still held out hope that his German Protestant subjects could be reconciled with the Church, but Paul refused to include any Protestants in the Council's deliberations. On 11 January 1547, for example, over Charles's strenuous objection the Council delivered its final pronouncement on the crucial doctrine of justification by faith; the Council condemned Protestant theological positions without ever hearing from actual Protestants. 52 Furthermore, despite the best efforts of Spanish ambassadors, bishops, and other pro-imperial participants to prevent it, in March 1547 the Council voted first to move to Bologna (outside of imperial territory) and then to dissolve the current session. Ostensibly the Council took these actions because of an outbreak of the plague in the city of Trent, but Charles and his ministers suspected more political -and explicitly anti-imperial--motives. 53 Pope Paul, who had been aiding Charles's military campaigns in Germany, decided at the end of January 1547 to break the alliance and withdraw his troops, supposedly because Charles had not done enough to restore Catholic worship in those lands. 54 In reality, the French faction in Rome had convinced the pope that it was not in his interest for Charles to become too powerful. 55 Moreover, Paul had long been harboring grudges against both Charles and Andrea Doria, because they opposed the pope's attempts to install his son Pier Luigi Farnese as the lord of various territories in northern Italy. 56 All of these factors formed the background for papal involvement with the Fieschi affair. Charles and his ministers in Italy received a number of intelligence reports about meetings between Fieschi, certain pro-French cardinals in Rome, and the pope himself, in the months preceding Fieschi's attempted coup. 57 On February 2, Charles met with a papal nuncio in the German city of Ulm, and directly accused the pope of complicity in the Fieschi affair, a charge the nuncio vehemently denied. 58 But the evidence kept piling up. On February 8, for example, Juan de Vega, Charles's resident ambassador in Rome, informed the emperor about a coded letter that one of Fieschi's henchmen had accidently dropped in that city. The letter had been deciphered, and clearly implicated the pope in the conspiracy. 59 Both Charles and his ministers in Italy must have felt great anger and frustration.
On top of that, there continued to be disturbing signs of unrest in the city of Genoa itself. This perception was not limited to the Spaniards: Febo Capella, the Venetian resident ambassador in Milan, warned his government that Andrea Doria was "ambiguous and irresolute" and that the situation in Genoa was "out of control." 60 On January 29, Figueroa sent two similarly uneasy letters to Charles. One briefly reported that the various factions in the city were all screaming at each other about whether the French or Charles was the greatest threat. Figueroa stated that the best way to calm the citizens down would be to have 600 or 700 Spanish infantry stationed there. 61 (Note that this was a rather Spanish-centered view about how to bring peace to the city!) In the other, somewhat longer letter, Figueroa added a revealing detail. 62 He requested that perhaps 25 or 30 soldiers should be quartered in his personal residence, "for my guard and security." He pointed out that on the night of the Fieschi affair, only his personal servants had been at home, where he also kept his money. He hastened to add that he wanted this personal bodyguard only for security reasons, not for reasons of pomp. But this request reveals much about how badly the Fieschi conspiracy had shaken Figueroa personally.
Given how anxious Figueroa seems to have been, one would think that he would have welcomed Charles's proposal to take over the city. But his actual response was rather negative. 63 In fact, he very carefully and diplomatically told the Emperor that he thought it was a bad idea. He absolutely agreed that keeping Genoa loyal, and out of the hands of the French, was critically important; but he argued against the "impatronirse" suggestion. For one thing, it would cost too much. (This argument surely resonated for the chronically cash-strapped emperor.) For another thing, it would not change the basic political character of the city. The city was hopelessly divided into factions, and always would be, no matter who was in charge. Taking over the city, Figueroa argued, would only permanently alienate one faction or another, which would then guarantee future seditions. The answer, he argued once again, was martial, not political: build a fortress, and man it with a permanent garrison, and then conduct business as usual. 64 It is remarkable that the Spanish ambassador would thus argue against enlarging the Spanish Habsburg empire in Italy. His attitude is even more striking in that it seemed to run counter to Charles's Italian policies. The duchy of Milan, for example, had been incorporated into the empire in 1535, in just the manner Charles had proposed for Genoa. 65 Furthermore, in 1545 Charles issued instructions, called the Órdenes de Worms, to Ferrante Gonzaga, governor of Milan, which emphasized the necessity of bringing that territory (as well as all of the other strategically significant imperial territories) under the strict and personal control of the emperor. 66 Presumably Figueroa was aware of these instructions, but he believed that the circumstances were different in Genoa. A key to understanding Figueroa's thinking comes towards the end of the letter of 30 January. According to the ambassador, certain Genoese citizens loyal to Charles approached him, and after pointing out that the present government could not last long (that is, Andrea Doria was about to die), they said "it would be best if Your Majesty took the city, and governed it" ["que es menester que V. M. tome esta ciudad enssi, y la govierne"]. A perfect moment to present Charles's proposal! But Figueroa denied that Charles had any desire to take such action, and furthermore:
I have said in the Signory [the Genoese government body], and to all those who have spoken with me, that Your Majesty wishes nothing more than that this city should be devoted to him, and it should not fall into the hands of those who would subject it and destroy its fundamentals, and that [His Majesty] wants to preserve its liberty and to aid it, and to always assist those who govern it, because if anything else were to be said to [the Genoese] it would scandalize them even more than they have been up to now, and leave us in great confusion.
So according to the Spanish resident ambassador in Genoa, the best policy was to reassure the Genoese that the emperor would not seize power, but would instead defend the city's republican government and traditions. 67 Anything else would lead to worse conditions for the Spanish cause.
Perhaps even more interesting than Figueroa giving this advice, Charles evidently accepted it. At this point, in late March 1547, Charles was once again on the march with his armies in Germany-in fact, getting into position for his famous victory over the Schmalkaldic League at Mühlberg. 68 From the road, on 29 March 1547, he wrote to Figueroa,
We have seen what you wrote concerning becoming the lord of the city [of Genoa], and the inconveniences you suggest would result from implementing it. After considering well, we concede that you are probably right, and have thought about it with the prudence and experience you are accustomed to display in matters of this sort, and thus we will put aside this matter for now, leaving it for a better occasion. And you have done very well in dissimulating with those who have spoken about and support this end, and in giving the understanding both in general and in particular terms that we have no intention other than to conserve this city in our devotion, and not to let it fall into anyone's else's hands, nor to allow anyone to destroy its liberty.
